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The engine that powers quantum cryptography is the principle that there are no physical means
for gathering information about the identity of a quantum system’s state (when it is known to be
prepared in one of a set of nonorthogonal states) without disturbing the system in a statistically
detectable way. This situation is often mistakenly described as a consequence of the “Heisenberg
uncertainty principle.” A more accurate account is that it is a unique feature of quantum phenomena
that rests ultimately on the Hilbert space structure of the theory along with the fact that time
evolutions for isolated systems are unitary. In this paper we shall explore several aspects of the
information–disturbance principle in an attempt to make it firmly quantitative and flesh out its
significance for quantum theory as a whole.
1 Introduction
Suppose an observer obtains a quantum system secretly
prepared in one of two nonorthogonal pure quantum
states. Quantum theory dictates that there is no mea-
surement he can use to certify which of the two states was
actually prepared. This is well known [18, and refs]. A
simple, but less recognized, corollary is that no interaction
used for performing such an information-gathering mea-
surement can leave both states unchanged in the process
[5]. If the observer could completely regenerate the un-
known quantum state after measurement, then—by mak-
ing further nondisturbing information-gathering measure-
ments on it—he would eventually be able to infer the
state’s identity after all.1
This consistency argument is enough to establish a ten-
sion between information gain and disturbance in quan-
tum theory. What it does not capture, however, is the
extent of the tradeoff between these two quantities. In
this paper, we shall lay the groundwork for a quantita-
tive study that goes beyond the qualitative nature of this
tension. Namely, we will show how to capture in a for-
mal way the idea that, depending upon the particular
measurement interaction, there can be a tradeoff between
the disturbance of the quantum states and the acquired
ability to make inferences about their identity. We shall
also explore the extent to which the very existence of this
tradeoff can be taken as a fundamental principle of quan-
tum theory—one from which unitary time evolution itself
might possibly be derived.
∗This work was supported in part by NSERC. Present address:
Norman Bridge Laboratory of Physics 12-33, California Institute of
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1For a nice pedagogical treatment of these points, see Ref. [10].
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next Sec-
tion, we lay out a general model (inspired by quantum
cryptography [4, 6]) upon which to formalize various no-
tions of the information–disturbance tradeoff. Section 3
places these ideas within the historical context, comparing
them to the standard folklore that quantum mechanical
measurements cause “uncontrollable disturbances” and
do so because of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle [34,
p. 445]. In Section 4, we carry out the calculations neces-
sary to develop one particularly simple tradeoff relation
for pure quantum states; this example captures much of
the essential physics of the problem. In Section 5, we say
what little can be said presently about quantitative trade-
off relations for mixed states. In particular, we point out
how a “no-cloning” theorem does not capture the essence
of the problem for mixed states. In Section 6, we describe
a sense in which Wigner’s theorem [42, 2] allows the stan-
dard axiom of unitarity for quantum mechanical evolu-
tions to be replaced with the ostensibly weaker one that
“eavesdropping on nonorthogonal quantum states causes
a disturbance.”
2 The Model
The model we shall base our considerations on is most
easily described in terms borrowed from quantum cryp-
tography, from whence it takes its origin. Alice randomly
prepares a quantum system to be in either a state ρˆ0 or a
state ρˆ1. These states, in the most general setting, are de-
scribed by density operators on an N -dimensional Hilbert
space for some N ; there is no restriction that they be
pure states, orthogonal, or commuting for that matter.
After the preparation, the quantum system is passed into
1
a “black box” where it may be probed by an eavesdropper
Eve in any way allowed by the laws of quantum mechan-
ics. That is to say, Eve may allow the system to interact
with an auxiliary system (which we shall call her probe)—
leaving the probe ultimately in one of two states ρˆE0 or
ρˆE1—so that after the systems have decoupled, she may
perform quantum mechanical measurements on the probe
itself. Because the outcome statistics of the measurement
will then be conditioned upon the quantum state that
went into the black box, the measurement may provide
Eve with some information about the quantum state and
may even provide her a basis on which to make an in-
ference as to the state’s identity. After this manhandling
by Eve, the original quantum system is passed out of the
black box and back into the possession of Alice.2
A crucial aspect of this model is that even if Alice knows
the exact manner in which Eve operates—i.e., her probe’s
initial state and the precise interaction she uses—because
the system will have become entangled3 with the probe,
she will necessarily have to resort to a new description
of the quantum system after it emerges from the black
box, say by some ρˆA0 or ρˆ
A
1 . That is to say, even if Alice
sends a pure state into the black box, a pure state will not
emerge out of it; rather it will be mixed. This is simply
because, by assumption, Alice does not have access to all
the relevant quantum systems.
This is where the detail of our work begins. Eve now
has the potential to gather information about identity of
Alice’s preparation, via the alternate states of her probe
ρˆE0 or ρˆ
E
1 . Meanwhile the states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 no longer form
valid descriptions of Alice’s system because it will have
become entangled with Eve’s ancilla.
The ingredients required to pose a precise tradeoff prin-
ciple for information gain and disturbance follow from the
setup of the model. We shall need:
• a concise account of all probes and interactions that
Eve may use to obtain evidence about the identity of
the state
• a convenient description of the most general kind of
quantum measurement she may then perform on her
probe
• a measure of the information or inference power pro-
vided by any given measurement,
2In this respect, the model differs from the standard one in quan-
tum key distribution. There, Eve eventually passes Alice’s quantum
system on to a third person Bob. Since we are not interested in key
distribution per se in this work, such an extra participant would be
superfluous.
3The term “entanglement” was first used by Schro¨dinger [36]
soon after the EPR paper [14] made its appearance. For historical
interest, and for the purpose of bringing it to the attention of a wider
audience, we point out that Einstein had a fairly clear notion of
entanglement in his mind as early as 9 July 1931. This is evidenced
by a letter from Ehrenfest to Bohr on that date. See Jammer’s
article [26] for details.
• a good notion by which to measure the distinguisha-
bility of mixed quantum states and a measure of dis-
turbance based on it, and finally
• a “figure of merit” by which to compare the distur-
bance with the inference.
We describe each of these ingredients in some detail in
the subsections below. Finally in Section 2.5, we explore
various ways of putting them together.
2.1 Evolutions
Since Eve cannot know which of the two quantum states
Alice prepared, the most general manipulation she can
perform on her newly acquired quantum system is to in-
teract it with another system prepared independently of
the particular state coming into the black box. Thus, if
the state of the system entering the black box ρˆs, s = 0, 1,
is a density operator on the Hilbert space HA, the initial
state of the joint system consisting of it and Eve’s probe
will be ρˆs ⊗ σˆ for some standard density operator σˆ on
the probe’s Hilbert space HE . (There need be no a priori
relation between the dimensionalities of HA and HE .)
Interacting the two systems in the most controlled way
that Eve possibly can, i.e., through some unitary inter-
action Uˆ , leads to the two systems being entangled with
only a single quantum state on HA ⊗HE between them:
ρˆAEs = Uˆ(ρˆs ⊗ σˆ)U † . (1)
After Alice’s original system emerges from the black box
and is placed back into her hands, her description of it
will be
ρˆAs = trE(ρˆ
AE
s ) = trE
(
Uˆ(ρˆs ⊗ σˆ)U †
)
, (2)
where trE represents a partial trace over Eve’s probe. The
system in Eve’s possession, will likewise afterward be de-
scribed by a new density operator
ρˆEs = trA(ρˆ
AE
s ) = trA
(
Uˆ(ρˆs ⊗ σˆ)U †
)
, (3)
where trA represents a partial trace over Alice’s system.
The class of evolutions described by Eq. (2) are called
“nonselective operations” by Kraus [29]. Note that if |Ei〉
is a basis in which the operator σˆ is diagonal, then we
may write Eq. (2) as
ρˆAs =
∑
i,j
√
σj〈Ei|Uˆ |Ej〉ρˆs〈Ej |Uˆ †|Ei〉√σj , (4)
where σj are the eigenvalues of σˆ. Letting the operators
Aˆij on HA be defined by
Aˆij =
√
σj〈Ei|Uˆ |Ej〉 (5)
2
and lumping the indexes, i.e., ℓ = (i, j), we can write
Eq. (4) as
ρˆAs =
∑
ℓ
AˆℓρˆsAˆ
†
ℓ . (6)
Note, furthermore, that the operators Aˆℓ satisfy the nor-
malization condition∑
ℓ
Aˆ†ℓAˆℓ = IˆA , (7)
where IˆA is the identity operator on HA. The content
of Kraus’s representation theorem is that any set of op-
erators Aˆℓ satisfying Eq. (7) can be used in Eq. (6) to
describe a valid nonselective operation. (A simple proof
of this theorem and a few others concerning nonselective
operations can be found in Ref. [37].)
The representation of a nonselective operation given by
Eqs. (6) and (7) can be quite convenient because it gives a
means of describing the evolution of Alice’s system purely
in terms of operators on her own Hilbert space HA.
2.2 Measurements
The most general notion of measurement allowed within
quantum mechanics is the POVM (short for Positive Op-
erator-Valued Measure) [29, 34]. These measurements
can always be interpreted in terms of the standard von
Neumann type if one is again willing to make use of an
auxiliary system or ancilla. The idea is simple and much
like that considered in the last subsection. Rather than
making a von Neumann measurement on HE directly,
there is nothing to stop Eve from first interacting her
probe with some ancilla and then performing a standard
measurement on the newly introduced ancilla. For in-
stance, in this way, Eve can perform a valid quantum
mechanical measurement on her probe with a cardinal-
ity for the outcome set in excess of the dimensionality of
HE . Such a type of measurement is sometimes necessary
for gaining the maximum information about a quantum
state [24, 12].
The nice thing about the formalism of POVMs is that
this whole process can be described formally without ever
making any mention of the extra ancilla. This can be seen
as follows. Let σˆc on HC be the initial state of the new
ancilla. After interacting the probe and the ancilla via
some unitary interaction Vˆ , say, the state of the combined
system will be Vˆ (ρˆEs ⊗ σˆc)Vˆ †. If a von Neumann measure-
ment is performed on the ancilla alone, there is some set
of orthogonal projectors Πˆb on the ancilla’s Hilbert space
such that
ps(b) = tr
(
Vˆ (ρˆEs ⊗ σˆc)Vˆ †(IˆE ⊗ Πˆb)
)
(8)
is the probability of the various outcomes of that mea-
surement. Here IˆE is the identity operator on HE .
Using the cyclic property of the trace function and split-
ting the single trace into a piece over the probe and a piece
over the ancilla, this becomes
ps(b) = trE
(
ρˆEs trC
(
(IˆE ⊗ σˆc)Vˆ †(IˆE ⊗ Πˆb)Vˆ
))
. (9)
Letting
Eˆb = trC
(
(IˆE ⊗ σˆc)Vˆ †(IˆE ⊗ Πˆb)Vˆ
)
, (10)
we obtain finally that
ps(b) = tr(ρˆ
E
s Eˆb) . (11)
As promised, all the operators in this expression refer to
the probe’s Hilbert space HE .
Note that the operators Eˆb are all nonnegative definite,
i.e.,
〈ψ|Eˆb|ψ〉 ≥ 0 (12)
for all |ψ〉, and satisfy the completeness relation∑
b
Eˆb = IˆE . (13)
Any set of operators {Eˆb} satisfying these two properties
is called a POVM. (This is because these two proper-
ties are the natural generalization to the operator realm
of the properties of a probability measure.) The POVM
formulation of a measurement is particularly convenient
for optimization problems because not only can POVMs
be derived from specific measurement models but, con-
versely, any set of operators {Eˆb} satisfying the definition
of a POVM can be identified with a measurement proce-
dure as described above [23]. This gives an easy algebraic
characterization of all possible measurements.
2.3 Information and Distinguishability
There are several ways by which to quantify the “infor-
mation” that Eve gathers about the identity of Alice’s
preparation. To say it another way, there are several mea-
sures with which to gauge Eve’s performance in learning
the identity of ρˆs. The best measure to use in a tradeoff
relation is determined by Eve’s particular needs. Will Eve
be encountering one copy of Alice’s system or many? If
many, then will the systems be prepared the same each
and every time, or rather will they be prepared randomly
in one of the two possibilities at each shot? If the latter
still, must Eve make an attempt to guess the identity of
each state before she receives the next, or rather may she
wait until very large blocks of data have been acquired?
All these things and many more must be considered before
choosing the exact measures for the relation.
For specificity, we shall consider three information and
distinguishability measures [18]. All these measures, in
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one sense or another, describe how much “information”
can be gained about the identity of a quantum state.
However, only one of the measures is truly information
theoretic in the sense of Shannon’s information theory
[38]. What is common to all three is that they each have
the power to reveal the physics behind the idea that in-
formation gain and state disturbance go hand in hand for
quantum physics.
Suppose Eve measures a POVM {Eˆb} on HE . If
Alice prepared ρˆ0, the outcomes of Eve’s measurement
will occur with probabilities p0(b) = tr(ρˆ
E
0Eˆb); if Alice
prepared ρˆ1, the outcomes will occur with probabilities
p1(b) = tr(ρˆ
E
1Eˆb). Given this measurement on Eve’s part,
the extent to which Alice’s preparations can be distin-
guished is exactly the extent to which the probability dis-
tributions p0(b) and p1(b) can be distinguished.
A very simple measure of the distinguishability of p0(b)
and p1(b) is the statistical overlap between these distri-
butions [43]:
B(p0, p1) =
∑
b
√
p0(b)
√
p1(b) . (14)
When there is no overlap between the distributions they
can certainly be distinguished completely. Alternatively,
the overlap is unity if and only if the distributions are
identical and cannot be distinguished at all. Such a mea-
sure of distinguishability is nice because of its relative
simplicity in expression. However, this measure is not
completely satisfactory in that it has no direct statistical-
inferential or information-theoretic meaning.
Another measure of how distinct p0(b) and p1(b) are
is the actual Shannon information obtainable about the
identity of the distribution. For complete generality, let
us suppose for the moment that Eve is expecting the two
different quantum states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 with possibly distinct
prior probabilities π0 and π1.
4 Then the amount of Shan-
non (mutual) information Eve stands to gain from the
measurement {Eˆb} is
I(p0, p1) = H(p)− π0H(p0)− π1H(p1) , (15)
where
H(q) = −
∑
b
q(b) log q(b) (16)
is the Shannon entropy of a probability distribution q(b),
and, in particular
p(b) = π0 p0(b) + π1 p1(b) (17)
4Up until this point, we have assumed that Eve has no prior
expectation for a bias concerning which state of the two would be
prepared. That is to say, we have been working under the assump-
tion that pi0 = pi1 = 1/2. This remains assumed even now, despite
the further generality of our formulation; the introduction of an
asymmetry is solely for the purpose of comparison to other forms
in the literature.
is the overall prior probability for an outcome b. This
measure is particularly appropriate for gauging Eve’s
measurement performance if her purpose is to identify or
make an inference about a long string of quantum states
prepared according to the distribution {π0, π1}.
Finally, we consider the situation in which Eve bases her
performance on the success of a guess about the identity
of one single instance of Alice’s prepared state. Suppose
Eve obtains outcome b in her measurement. She can use
this knowledge to update her probabilities or expectations
about which state Alice really prepared. This is done
formally via a use of Bayes’ rule [8]. Namely, after the
measurement, her posterior expectation for the value of s
is given by
p(s|b) = πs ps(b)
p(b)
. (18)
Clearly the best strategy for Eve is to guess the value of s
such that p(s|b) is largest. Her probability of making an
error will then be the minimum of p(0|b) and p(1|b). Av-
eraging this over all possible outcomes gives the expected
probability of error upon making the measurement {Eˆb}:
Pe(p0, p1) =
∑
b
min
{
π0 p0(b), π1 p1(b)
}
. (19)
The three measures, Eqs. (14), (15), and (19), each
have the heuristic properties required of one ingredient in
a tradeoff principle: as we vary across measurements, the
smaller the overlap, the larger the Shannon mutual infor-
mation, or the smaller the error probability of a guess,
then, heuristically, the larger the “information” Eve has
available about Alice’s preparation. This is not to say,
however, that the measurement optimal for any one of
these distinguishability measures will be the same as that
for any other; this will generally not be the case [18].
For instance, when ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 are both invertible, the
measurement optimal for minimizing the statistical over-
lap [17], Eq. (14), is the von Neumann measurement cor-
responding to the rather complicated Hermitian operator5
ρˆE1
−
1
2
√
ρˆE1
1
2 ρˆE0 ρˆ
E
1
1
2 ρˆE1
−
1
2 . (20)
The measurement optimal for maximizing the mutual
information, Eq. (15), generally has no analytic expres-
sion, as can already be seen at the level of density opera-
tors on two dimensional Hilbert spaces [16, 18]. On top of
that, more generally, the number of outcomes in an opti-
mal measurement is not even known; the strongest result
yet proven only bounds that number to be less than the
square of the Hilbert space dimension [12].
In contrast, the measurement for optimizing the prob-
ability of error [23], Eq. (19), is again a von Neumann
5The square root of a nonnegative definite operator signifies an
operator diagonal in the same basis as the said operator but whose
eigenvalues are the positive square roots of the previous.
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measurement. In fact, this time the optimal measurement
corresponds to a fairly simple Hermitian operator:
Γˆ = π1ρˆ
E
1 − π0ρˆE0 . (21)
Generally there are no values of π0 and π1 such that all
three “optimal” measurements coincide.
To reflect the fact that we are interested only in Eve’s
ultimate performance as an ingredient for an information–
disturbance principle, we focus hereafter on the optimized
versions of the three distinguishability measures. This
forces all measurement dependence on Eve’s part out of
the picture.
The minimal statistical overlap after varying over all
measurements turns out to be [17, 18]:
B(ρˆE0 , ρˆ
E
1) = tr
√
ρˆE1
1
2 ρˆE0 ρˆ
E
1
1
2 . (22)
This is quantity is related to the Uhlmann fidelity function
F (ρˆE0 , ρˆ
E
1) for quantum states [39, 27] through
6
F (ρˆE0 , ρˆ
E
1) =
(
B(ρˆE0 , ρˆ
E
1)
)2
. (23)
The fidelity has several interesting properties despite
its somewhat loose connection to statistical tests. For in-
stance, though it is necessarily bounded between 0 and
1, it equals unity if and only if the two quantum states
in its arguments are identical. Also, despite first appear-
ances, it is symmetric in its arguments. In the case that
ρˆE1 = |ψE1 〉〈ψE1 | is a pure state, Eq. (22) reduces to
F (ρˆE0 , ρˆ
E
1) = 〈ψE1 |ρˆE0 |ψE1 〉 . (24)
The optimal mutual information, or accessible informa-
tion, I(ρˆE0 , ρˆ
E
1), again, generally has no analytic expres-
sion. However, there is a growing literature of succes-
sively better bounds on this quantity—see references in
Ref. [18]. One particularly interesting bound (because of
its simplicity in form) due to Holevo [25, 16] is
I(ρˆE0 , ρˆ
E
1) ≤ S(ρˆE)− π0S(ρˆE0)− π1S(ρˆE1) , (25)
where
ρˆE = π0ρˆ
E
0 + π1ρˆ
E
1 (26)
and
S(σˆ) = −tr(σˆ log σˆ) (27)
is the von Neumann entropy of a density operator σˆ. It
should be pointed out, however, that this bound is often
not very tight; the satisfaction of equality in Eq. (25)
comes about if and only if ρˆE0 and ρˆ
E
1 commute.
6A distinction is drawn between fidelity and minimal statistical
overlap because, for different applications, one form can be more
convenient than the other. As far as interpretation is concerned,
the two quantities appear to be on an equal footing.
Finally, as might have been expected, the optimal error
probability turns out to be the simplest distinguishability
measure of the lot:
Pe(ρˆ
E
0 , ρˆ
E
1) =
1
2
− 1
2
tr
∣∣∣π1ρˆE1 − π0ρˆE0 ∣∣∣ , (28)
where | · | signifies an operator diagonal in the same basis
as its argument, but with eigenvalues that are the absolute
values of those of the argument. (Because this particular
distinguishability measure is so important for the consid-
erations here, we give a new derivation of Eq. (28) in the
Appendix.)
Of the three measures of Eve’s performance discussed
here, perhaps the accessible information is the most rele-
vant for eavesdropping in quantum key distribution. How-
ever, even this has its shortfalls. Presently it is not known
whether there is any single numeric summary of Eve’s
posterior probabilities for the identity of ρˆs—such as the
mutual information—that can be used for privacy ampli-
fication [7] against all possible eavesdropping strategies
[31].
2.4 Disturbance Measures
In order to gauge the amount of disturbance Eve inflicts
upon Alice’s system as she gains information about it,
we must find a way compare the state of Alice’s system
before it enters the black box to the state of the system
after it exits. That is to say, we must find a way to com-
pare both ρˆ0 to ρˆ
A
0 and ρˆ1 to ρˆ
A
1 . Of course, no single
simple numerical measure or “distance” will be adequate
to all tasks: the quantum states are operators on HA. In
matrix representation, each state will have up to N2 − 1
real parameters (corresponding to the real and imaginary
parts of its entries). Just naively, one would expect that
it should take at least that many numbers to capture all
aspects of Eve’s disturbance.
Nevertheless, one can still go a long way toward quan-
tifying disturbance with simple numerical measures. In
particular, to get started, one need only notice that there
are at least as many disturbance measures as there are
distinguishability measures. Each of these can be used as
a notion of “distance” between the initial and final states.
Moreover, these are especially nice in that they have direct
experimental significance, each being intrinsically tied to
some statistical or information theoretic test.
As a simple example of how a distinguishability mea-
sure can be used to make a disturbance measure, consider
the following quantity:
D(Uˆ) = 1− 1
2
F (ρˆ0, ρˆ
A
0 )−
1
2
F (ρˆ1, ρˆ
A
1 ) . (29)
This is just one minus the average fidelity between input
and output. Notice that D(Uˆ) has a functional depen-
dence on the initial states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1, the dimensionality
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of Eve’s probe’s Hilbert spaceHE , the probe’s initial state
σˆ, and the particular unitary interaction Uˆ that Eve uses
for her eavesdropping. For brevity and convenience, we
have made only the functional dependence on Uˆ explicit
in the labeling of this disturbance measure.
Equation (29) fulfills—at the very least—the minimal
requirement of an intuitive disturbance measure: it has
the virtue that it vanishes if and only if ρˆA0 = ρˆ0 and
ρˆA1 = ρˆ1. In addition to that, however, it equals unity if
and only if the outputs are orthogonal to the inputs—that
is, that Eve’s eavesdropping has probability one of being
caught. Finally, because it can be interpreted as related
to the statistical overlap of two probability distributions,
we can be sure that it is monotonic with our intuition at
all points between.
Eq. (29) is perfectly reasonable as far our purposes are
concerned. Nevertheless, one should not lose sight of the
fact that D(Uˆ) is quite arbitrary as a disturbance mea-
sure. This remains true even if one insists that a distur-
bance measure be built from the fidelity function alone
and not any other distinguishability measure. For in-
stance, one can still ask, “Why take an average of the
two fidelities? Why not a geometrical mean? Why not
relate the disturbance to the minimum of the two fideli-
ties?” The questions can go on and on. The only means
for relieving the arbitrariness in choosing a disturbance
measure is to have a specific physical/experimental appli-
cation in mind. This is just as it was for the discussion of
Eve’s possible information-gain measures.
Let us give one more example along these lines to help
firm the idea that the number of variations on the theme
is quite large. Suppose Alice expects the eavesdropper to
be active at random and only 50% of the time. When-
ever active, Eve will use the same strategy Eq. (6), which
Alice knows in advance. A natural notion of disturbance
for this particular scenario is the (best possible) proba-
bility that Alice can catch Eve out when she is active.
When the probability of catching Eve is large, then the
disturbance can be assumed large; when the probability
of catching Eve is no better than chance, then the dis-
turbance is small. Thus, referring to Eq. (28), the distur-
bance of input state s is quantified by
Ps =
1
2
+
1
4
tr
∣∣∣ρˆs − ρˆAs ∣∣∣ . (30)
On average then, the disturbance viewed in this way is
DG(Uˆ) =
1
2
P0 +
1
2
P1
=
1
2
+
1
8
tr
∣∣∣ρˆ0 − ρˆA0 ∣∣∣ + 18tr
∣∣∣ρˆ1 − ρˆA1 ∣∣∣ .
(31)
The same sort of game, of course, can also be played with
the maximal amount of information that Alice can gain
about Eve’s activity, giving rise to still another distur-
bance measure.
Finally we note that, above and beyond these examples,
there are still other ways of using the distinguishability
measures of the last subsection for the purpose of gaug-
ing Eve’s disturbance. For instance, they may be used
not only to compare the input and output states of Al-
ice’s system but also for checking the extent to which Eve
has broken the coherence of that system with yet other
systems. This is an idea due to Schumacher [37]. It is
especially relevant to the model considered in this paper
because Alice recovers her quantum system after Eve has
interacted with it; Alice’s system is not passed on to a
third person, such as Bob, as is the case in quantum key
distribution scenarios. Therefore Alice is in the position
to check whether coherences have indeed been broken.
By the same token, this measure may be less relevant to
quantum cryptography.
Let us spell out Schumacher’s idea in some detail. Sup-
pose Alice prepares her two states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 by preparing
a composite system in the pure states |ψAB0 〉 and |ψAB1 〉 on
the tensor product Hilbert space HA⊗HB. The intention
is to give to Eve only that part of the system described
on the Hilbert space HA. Therefore, for s = 0, 1, the pure
states must satisfy
ρˆs = trB
(
|ψABs 〉〈ψABs |
)
. (32)
If the upshot of Eve’s interaction with HA is given by
Eq. (6), then the overall state of the composite system
after the single component emerges from the black box
will be
ρˆABs =
∑
ℓ
(Aˆℓ ⊗ IˆB)|ψABs 〉〈ψABs |(Aˆℓ ⊗ IˆB)† , (33)
where IˆB is the identity operator on HB. The main point
is that we need not be content comparing only ρˆs to ρˆ
A
s
because in this scenario we also have the option of com-
paring |ψABs 〉 to ρˆABs .
One might think that such a procedure would open a
can of worms with respect to the original statement of
our problem. For instance, by introducing the purifi-
cation |ψABs 〉 of ρˆs, one might think we are introducing
much more freedom in the formulation of the problem
than there was previously. There are an infinite num-
ber of purifications of the given density operators with
all manner of relations between themselves. One would
think that surely, whatever disturbance measure we build
with these purifications, it will inherit that extraneous
freedom.
Surprisingly, that turns out not to be the case—at least
for some measures of distinguishability. To take as an
example, one can speak of the fidelity between input and
output in this scenario, a quantity Schumacher calls the
6
entanglement fidelity:
Fs ≡ F
(
|ψABs 〉〈ψABs | , ρˆABs
)
. (34)
This quantity turns out to be completely independent of
the particular purification chosen for ρˆs [37]. Hence it
can be expressed purely in terms of ρˆs and the particular
operation Eve subjected ρˆs. In Ref. [37], it is shown that
Fs =
∑
ℓ
∣∣∣tr(ρˆsAˆℓ)∣∣∣2 . (35)
As might be expected, the entanglement fidelity can be
a more exacting measure of change between input and
output. For instance, it can be proven that [27, 3]
Fs ≤ F (ρˆs, ρˆAs ) . (36)
Thus, if Eq. (29) is considered an adequate disturbance
measure for a particular application of our model, then so
too should the more stringent measure
DS(Uˆ) = 1 − 1
2
F0 − 1
2
F1
= 1 − 1
2
∑
ℓ
∣∣∣tr(ρˆ0Aˆℓ)∣∣∣2 − 1
2
∑
ℓ
∣∣∣tr(ρˆ1Aˆℓ)∣∣∣2 .
(37)
This is just a small sampling of the numerous things
that can be imagined for gauging disturbance in a quan-
tifiable way. Nevertheless, the options are already great
enough to start thinking seriously of several ways of view-
ing an information–disturbance tradeoff principle.
2.5 Tradeoff
Finally, we are in a position of taking our two building
blocks, information measures and disturbance measures,
and combining them to arrive at a formal tradeoff princi-
ple. The first thing to recall is that once the two quantum
states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 are fixed, the only free variables in any
of the measures are the dimensionality of HE , the probe’s
initial state σˆ, and the unitary interaction Uˆ . To expedite
our discussion, let us consider a generic information mea-
sure I(Uˆ) and a generic disturbance measure D(Uˆ ). The
discussion to follow remains true for any two such mea-
sures. It should be noted that only the Uˆ -dependence of
I and D has been made explicit. (The reason for this will
be made clear below.)
There are at least two straightforward ways to combine
I(Uˆ ) and D(Uˆ) into various “tradeoff relations.” The
simplest idea is rather analogous to the construction of
the Heisenberg uncertainty relations in that it is based
on the idea that there must be some standard “figure of
merit” for comparing information and disturbance. In the
Heisenberg relations, the figure of merit for the “tradeoff”
of ∆x and ∆p is a multiplicative one:
∆x∆p ≥ h¯
2
. (38)
In our case, we may well imagine a standard or convenient
function F : IR× IR→ IR with which to compare the two
quantities of our concern. If it is an interesting function,
then it will be bounded in at least one direction—say,
from below—and we will be at liberty to define
B(ρˆ0, ρˆ1) = min F
(
I(Uˆ),D(Uˆ)
)
, (39)
where the minimum is taken over all the free variables of
I and D. Notice that what remains is a function purely
of the two input states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1. Eq. (39) defines an
information–disturbance tradeoff relation for an arbitrary
probe, probe initial state, and interaction on Eve’s part
by
F
(
I(Uˆ),D(Uˆ )
)
≥ B(ρˆ0, ρˆ1) . (40)
The right hand side of Eq. (40) plays the role of the h¯/2
in the Heisenberg relations. As already noted, the lower
bound in this new principle depends on the two quantum
states under consideration. This is completely reasonable:
one expects a necessary information–disturbance tradeoff
only when the two states being compared cannot be in-
terpreted as “classical” states. For instance, when ρˆ0 and
ρˆ1 are pure and orthogonal, all the information about the
state’s identity can be recovered without incurring any
disturbance whatsoever.
The second way to think about a tradeoff relation is to
ask, “For a fixed disturbance, what is the maximal infor-
mation that Eve can recover about the state’s identity?”
This defines a constrained-variation problem: for fixed
D(Uˆ) = d , (41)
where d is some constant, what is
Iopt = max I(Uˆ ) ? (42)
The optimization here again is taken over all the free vari-
ables of I, namely over all probes, over all initial states for
each probe, and over all unitary interactions. As opposed
to the last method, which characterizes the nonclassicality
of ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 by a single number, this method characterizes
the same via a complete curve, say,
C =
{
Iopt(d)
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ d ≤ 1} . (43)
Equations (40) and (43) encapsulate the essence of what
this paper is about.7 Using any of the measures of the
7Our emphasis of these options for expressing the information–
disturbance principle should not be taken to preclude the possibility
that weaker bounds along the same lines might also be useful. For
instance, an unachievable bound in Eq. (40) may also be of interest
for various purposes. For an application along these lines related to
quantum cryptography, see Ref. [30].
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preceding subsections, or using any measures left yet un-
considered, these equations define quite rigorously what
is meant by the phrase “information gain and quantum
state disturbance go hand in hand in quantum theory.”
In Section 4, we shall carry out the information–
disturbance principle program in some detail for two pure
quantum states. This gives something of a flavor for how
the program goes in the general case, but it also hints at
the calculational difficulties that crop up even in the sim-
plest of cases. Before pursuing this, however, we explore
in the next section the significance of this principle within
the historical context.
3 Historical Context
In this Section, we shall briefly explore the connection be-
tween the ideas developed here and some common preju-
dices concerning measurements and disturbance.
It is often said that the Heisenberg uncertainty relations
are the ultimate reason that Eve’s measurements disturb
Alice’s system in quantum key distribution.8 To the ex-
tent that this statement can be given a precise meaning,
it is rather beside the point in this context. The Heisen-
berg relations concern our conceptual and experimental
inability to simultaneously “get hold” of two classical ob-
servables, such as a particle’s position x and momentum p.
Thus they concern our inability to ascribe classical states
of motion to quantum mechanical systems. This remains
true of any of the standard meanings for the phrase “un-
certainty relation”—that is, whether one is speaking of a
semiclassical argument like Heisenberg’s original one [21],
the well-known textbook version of the relation due to
Robertson [35], or instead rigorous bounds on the simul-
taneous measurability of conjugate variables [1].
Moreover, the Robertson version of the relation has
nothing to say about the idea that observing one clas-
sical variable causes a “disturbance” to the other. In par-
ticular, upon following its derivation carefully, one finds
nothing remotely resembling the picture of the Heisenberg
argument [34]. What is found instead is that, when many
copies of a system are prepared in the same quantum
state ψ(x), if one makes enough position measurements
on the copies to get an estimate of ∆x, and similarly
makes enough momentum measurements on different(!)
copies to get an estimate of ∆p, then one can be assured
that the product of those numbers will be no smaller than
h¯/2. No reciprocal “disturbance” of any kind is involved
here, since xˆ and pˆ are measured on different systems.
The source of the misunderstanding is perhaps typified
by statements such as the following from Wolfgang Pauli,
8One notable exception is Ref. [15], which asserts, “. . . quan-
tum cryptography . . . relies on the impossibility of ascribing defi-
nite values to noncommuting variables in order to assure secrecy of
communication.”
collecting a set of thoughts now ingrained in the folklore
of the theory [32, p. 132]:
The indivisibility of elementary quantum pro-
cesses (finiteness of the quantum of action) finds
expression in an indeterminacy of the interac-
tion between instrument of observation (subject)
and the system observed (object), which can-
not be got rid of by determinable corrections. It
is therefore only the experimental arrangement
that defines the physical state of the system,
whose characterization thus essentially involves
some knowledge about the system. For every
act of observation is an interference, of undeter-
minable extent, with the instruments of observa-
tion as well as with the system observed, and in-
terrupts the causal connection between the phe-
nomena preceding and succeeding it. The gain
of knowledge by means of an observation has as
a necessary and natural consequence the loss of
some other knowledge. The observer has how-
ever the free choice, corresponding to two mutu-
ally exclusive experimental arrangements, of de-
termining what particular knowledge is gained
and what other knowledge is lost (complemen-
tary pairs of opposites). Therefore every irre-
vocable interference by an observation with the
sources of information about a system alters its
state, and creates a new phenomenon in Bohr’s
sense.
These sorts of ideas, folklore or not, have very little to
do with the limits of what can happen to quantum states
when information is gathered about their identity. The
theme of the approach suggested by quantum cryptogra-
phy differs from that used in formulating the Heisenberg
relations in that it makes no reference to conjugate or
complementary variables. The only elements entering the
considerations are related to the quantum states them-
selves. Because of this, one is forced to contemplate a
notion of state disturbance that is purely quantum me-
chanical in character, making no reference to the semi-
classical considerations that drove early conceptual work
on the theory.
Indeed, the main contribution of quantum cryptog-
raphy to fundamental physical understanding has been
the lesson that that we must focus on multiple (non-
orthogonal) quantum states for the construction of an
information–disturbance principle.9 Once the focus is
shifted from conceptually gauging disturbance in terms of
classical variables to gauging it in terms of the the quan-
tum states themselves, there is no necessary disturbance
whatsoever connected to the process of measurement—if
one is talking about a single quantum state [29]. For in-
9The first appearance of this idea seems to be in the work of
Stephen Wiesner circa 1970. It was written up in a manuscript
titled “Conjugate Coding” submitted to IEEE Transactions on In-
formation Theory, but remained unpublished until much later [41].
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stance, suppose Eve encounters only a single pure state
|ψ〉 in our scenario—rather than one of a set of two
nonorthogonal states—and she makes a measurement di-
rectly on Alice’s system corresponding to a set of orthog-
onal projectors Πˆb = |b〉〈b|. Then there is no physical
principle that can prevent her from using a measurement
interaction that returns Alice’s quantum system back to
the state |ψ〉 at its completion. This is a simple con-
sequence of the fact that Eve knows the identity of the
incoming state. Her general inability to predict her mea-
surement outcome cannot erase this—it does not matter
how random the outcome of the measurement turns out
to be. Nor does it matter that a second measurement
of the same observable may reveal a completely different
outcome than the first.
The idea of a necessary disturbance to quantum states
upon measurement only becomes effective when that mea-
surement’s “random” outcome reveals some statistical in-
formation about the identity of the unknown quantum
state. Also crucial here is that the set of possible states,
even though known to Eve, have at least some elements
nonorthogonal to the others. This makes a classical repre-
sentation of the states in terms of mutually existent objec-
tive properties impossible. This is the legacy of quantum
cryptography.
What does it mean to say that the states are disturbed
in and of themselves without reference to classical vari-
ables? It means quite literally that Alice faces a loss
of predictability about the outcomes of further measure-
ments on her system whenever an information gathering
eavesdropper has intervened. Take as an example the case
where ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 are nonorthogonal pure states. Then,
for each of these, there exists one nontrivial observable
for which Alice can predict the outcome with complete
certainty—namely the projectors parallel to ρˆ0 and ρˆ1.
That is to say, she can ask the system, “Are you in the
state I prepared you in,” and it will answer yes with cer-
tainty. However, after her system passes into the black
box occupied by Eve and returns, she will no longer be
able to predict completely the outcomes of both these
measurements. This is the real content of these ideas:
the disturbance is to Alice’s description of her system and
what she can predict of it.
4 Pure States
We shall devote ourselves in this Section to working out,
for two nonorthogonal pure states, one of the many trade-
off principles discussed in Section 2. The particular one
considered is motivated by its overall simplicity, not by its
operational significance for quantum cryptography. The
overriding concern is that—in this way—we will be able
to carry out the majority of the steps analytically. Con-
sequently, in this exercise, we will be less reliant on vari-
ous numerically motivated conjectures than was the case
for previous endeavors [19]. It is hoped that this pro-
cedure will lead to insight into the general structure of
more practically-motivated tradeoff principles, such as
that considered in Ref. [19].10
Let us jump into the example. The two quantum states
that Alice prepares are ρˆ0 = |0〉〈0| and ρˆ1 = |1〉〈1| where
|0〉 = cosα |a0〉 + sinα |a1〉 (44)
|1〉 = sinα |a0〉 + cosα |a1〉 , (45)
are vectors on a two-dimensional Hilbert space HA. Here
|a0〉 and |a1〉 form an orthonormal basis on HA. Alge-
braically, the distinction between these states is parame-
terized by the single number
S = 〈0|1〉 = sin 2α . (46)
As already discussed in great detail, Eve—in an at-
tempt to gather information about the identity of the
state Alice prepared—will interact Alice’s system with a
probe described by the states on a Hilbert spaceHE . This
will lead to Alice being left finally in possession of a sys-
tem described by a density operator ρˆAs . Similarly Eve
will be left with her probe being described by some den-
sity operator ρˆEs . In each case, the value of s depends on
Alice’s particular preparation.
The tradeoff principle we shall consider in this Section is
based on the information-gain and disturbance measures
of Eqs. (28) and (29), which here reduce to
Pe(Uˆ) =
1
2
− 1
4
tr
∣∣∣ ρˆE1 − ρˆE0 ∣∣∣ (47)
and
D(Uˆ) = 1 − 1
2
〈0|ρˆA0 |0〉 −
1
2
〈1|ρˆA1 |1〉 , (48)
respectively. That is to say, the “information” measure is
taken to be the best possible probability of error that Eve
can encounter when trying to guess the identity of Alice’s
preparation; the disturbance measure is taken to be the
average probability that Alice will detect a discrepancy if
she performs a test corresponding to the actual state she
sent into the black box.
The particular way we shall combine the two ingre-
dients, Eqs. (47) and (48), is in finding a curve as in
Eq. (43). That is to say, for fixed
D(Uˆ) = d , (49)
and
P opte (d) = min
Uˆ
Pe(Uˆ) , (50)
10The tradeoff principle there is based on the same disturbance
measure as considered here. However the information measure is
the actual Shannon information accessible to Eve. Under certain
circumstances and certain assumptions, these two quantities are suf-
ficient for defining a privacy amplification procedure for quantum
key distribution [9] in the context of the BB84 protocal [4].
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where the minimization is performed subject to the con-
straint, we seek to find the curve
C =
{
P opte (d)
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ d ≤ d0 } . (51)
The constant d0 denotes the minimal disturbance that
need be incurred in the process of finding the maximal
allowed information. Thus we are assuming that the dis-
turbance is never so large as to be an unnecessary distur-
bance.11
This plan requires that we be able to perform the con-
strained variation necessary for it. We tackle this problem
in several steps. The first is in finding the simplest gen-
eral description of the probe and its unitary interaction
with Alice’s system. The second is in calculating all the
relevant quantities of the tradeoff relation for a fixed in-
teraction on Eve’s part. The third is making a two-state
probe plausible by analyzing a set of variational equations.
Finally the curve is optimized based on the assumption
of a two state probe.
4.1 The Probe and Interaction
We set the wheels turning by noticing that there is no
utility in Eve allowing her probe to start off in a mixed
state. This is because any mixed state for Eve’s probe
can always be thought of as arising from a partial trace
over the degrees of freedom of a larger probe prepared in
a pure state [27]. Since the dimensionality of the probe’s
Hilbert space HE is a free variable anyway, this choice
will cause no loss in generality.
But then, however, there is no use in declaring the ini-
tial state of the probe in our variations: any pure state can
be transformed unitarily into any other pure state. This
forms the reason why we have made Uˆ the only explicit
argument of the various information and disturbance mea-
sures: it encodes both the probe’s dimensionality and the
particular interaction it undertakes.
Let us now focus on saying something about the di-
mensionality of HE . The interaction Uˆ takes its formal
description as a unitary operator on HA ⊗HE . Suppos-
ing, as just discussed, the probe starts off in some stan-
dard pure state |ψ〉, we can describe the outcome of this
interaction as follows:
|s〉|ψ〉 −→ |ΨAEs 〉 =
1∑
n=0
√
λsn |Asn〉|Esn〉 , (52)
s = 0, 1, and where |ΨAEs 〉 is written in Schmidt polar form
[34] for orthonormal bases |Asn〉 and |Esn〉 (parameterized
by Alice’s preparation s) onHA andHE respectively. The
bases and the constants λsn will of course depend on the
particular unitary operation Uˆ used. The important thing
11This assumption is not necessary; it is made only for the purpose
of relaxing the need to make repetitive conditional statements later.
to note, however, is that the number of nonzero λsn is
determined by the dimensionality of HA.
Writing the post-interaction states in Schmidt polar
form is particularly convenient because then one easily
sees that the state of the system finally left in Eve’s pos-
session is of the form
ρˆEs = trA
(
|ΨAEs 〉〈ΨAEs |
)
= λs0|Es0〉〈Es0 | + λs1|Es1〉〈Es1 | . (53)
Similarly the states passed back to Alice are of the form
ρˆAs = trE
(
|ΨAEs 〉〈ΨAEs |
)
= λs0|As0〉〈As0| + λs1|As1〉〈As1| . (54)
Eq. (53) tells us, rather interestingly, that we never
need consider probes for Eve with Hilbert space dimension
greater than four [19]. This follows because, at most, all
four of the |Esn〉 can be linearly independent vectors. This
means that the relevant states accessible to Eve can never
act on more than the span of these four vectors. The
states ρˆE0 and ρˆ
E
1 are thus always confined to actions on
(effectively) four-dimensional Hilbert spaces at the outset.
It was found numerically—but not proven—for the
tradeoff relation considered in Ref. [19] that, in the end,
a two-state probe always sufficed for defining the optimal
tradeoff curve. In certain ways, this was rather surpris-
ing: Eve’s probe never need take advantage of all the
Hilbert space allotted it. Therefore it would be very nice
to demonstrate the same effect rigorously for the present
tradeoff relation. Unfortunately, this goal has yet to be
found attainable: the algebra becomes quite unwieldy.
The best that has been demonstrated (assuming the var-
ious mild assumptions to be made below) is that a two-
state probe makes the tradeoff stationary. However, this
does not demonstrate that a two-state probe is globally
optimal; it only demonstrates that a two-state probe is lo-
cally the best, the worst, or an inflection point. There are
indeed other local optima, though—based on numerical
simulations—none appear to be the global optimum.
In what follows, we shall sidestep the issue of trying to
show that, starting with a four-dimensional probe, a two-
dimensional one suffices to make the variation stationary.
There appears to be nothing to be gained from this ex-
ercise other than mathematical heartache. Instead, here,
we shall start off within the restricted scenario of allowing
HE to be up to three dimensional. This allows for a much
easier path to the essential physics that a two-state probe
suffices for the construction of the optimal (stationary,
to be more precise) Pe–D tradeoff curve. It also cleans
up the mathematics in this paper considerably and helps
make the exposition tractable. It must be emphasized,
however, that by making this restriction, we cut off the
possibility of proving that the curve we shall ultimately
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obtain is actually optimal—though, based on numerical
work, we certainly believe it is. Full rigor or a better
methodology for tackling this problem must remain the
subject of future work.
All that said, let us take HE to be a three-dimensional
Hilbert space and let us equip it with an orthonormal ba-
sis |eβ〉, β = x, y, z. (Ultimately we will choose this basis
to be as convenient as possible.) This gives a natural basis
for the Hilbert spaceHA⊗HE , namely the tensor product
basis |am〉|eβ〉, m = 0, 1 and β = x, y, z. The set of all
possible unitary operators on this six dimensional Hilbert
space is quite large: without some further symmetry ar-
guments for reducing its size, our variational problem will
remain quite intractable. To this end, let us start building
some notation.
Let us write the action of each unitary operator Uˆ in
our variational in the following way:
Uˆ |am〉|ψ〉 =
1∑
n=0
|an〉|Rmn〉 , (55)
where
|Rmn〉 =
∑
β
Umnβ|eβ〉 . (56)
Since Eve’s probe starts off in the standard state |ψ〉, we
need not be concerned with the action of Uˆ on the remain-
der of the Hilbert space. Note that unitarity requires that∑
n,β
U∗mnβUm′nβ = δm,m′ . (57)
At least one thing should be clear at this point. If Alice
were to relabel her orthonormal basis |am〉 by interchang-
ing 0 and 1, this would only lead to a relabeling of her
two input states. The algebraic relation between the in-
put states, Eq. (46), remains invariant. Thus one should
expect that Eve will never need to break that symmetry in
her apparatus to ferret out the best tradeoff. Therefore,
we may fairly safely assume that under the interchange
0 ↔ 1, the probe’s states (relative to the basis states of
Alice’s system) keep the same algebraic relations among
themselves. That is to say, we may assume that the opera-
tor Uˆ is always such that all inner products 〈Rm′n′ |Rmn〉
remain invariant under an interchange of 0 ↔ 1 in the
indices.
This already places severe restrictions on the set of uni-
tary operators that we need consider for the variation.
However, we can still go a few steps further in restriction.
For this let us write the input states in Eqs. (44) and (45)
as
|s〉 =
1∑
m=0
csm|am〉 . (58)
Then, we can rewrite Eq. (52) as
|ΨAEs 〉 =
1∑
n=0
|am〉|Rsn〉 , (59)
where
|Rsn〉 =
1∑
m=0
csm|Rmn〉 . (60)
In this notation, the final states accessible to Eve for in-
formation gathering measurements are
ρˆEs =
1∑
n=0
|Rsn〉〈Rsn| . (61)
Equation (61) is of particular interest because it tells us
that we can freely adjust the phase of all the vectors |Rsn〉
with no effect whatsoever on the states received by Eve.
This translates into the freedom to set the phase of the
|Rmn〉 as we wish, as long as we do it to |R00〉 and |R10〉
in unison and as long as we do it to |R01〉 and |R11〉 in
unison. (This follows from the requirement that Eq. (60)
hold.)
To see where this is going, let us write the four equa-
tions implicit in Eq. (56) as:
|R00〉 = X1|ex〉+X2|ey〉+X3|ez〉 (62)
|R01〉 = X4|ex〉+X5|ey〉+X6|ez〉 (63)
|R10〉 = X7|ex〉+X8|ey〉+X9|ez〉 (64)
|R11〉 = X10|ex〉+X11|ey〉+X12|ez〉 . (65)
In terms of these new variables, the unitarity relation
Eq. (57) becomes,
6∑
k=1
X∗kXk =
12∑
k=7
X∗kXk = 1 , (66)
and
6∑
k=1
X∗kXk+6 = 0 . (67)
What we would like to do is use the freedom in the
arbitrary basis |eβ〉, the symmetry requirements, and the
extra phase freedom just mentioned to make the Xk, k =
1, . . . , 12 as simple looking as possible. To do this, we
first choose the phase of |R11〉 so that X12 is real. Next,
we recognize the fact that |R01〉 and |R10〉 must be of the
same length. This follows because we require
〈R01|R01〉 = 〈R10|R10〉 . (68)
Therefore, we may choose the basis states |eβ〉 so that:
X4 = X8, X5 = X7, X4 and X5 are both real, and X6 =
X9 = 0. Finally we use the phase freedom in |R00〉 and
|ez〉 to make both X2 and X3 real. In particular, we take
the opportunity to make X3 and X12 of the same sign.
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Thus the situation is, at present, the following
|R00〉 = X1eiθ1 |ex〉+X2|ey〉+X3|ez〉 (69)
|R01〉 = X4|ex〉+X5|ey〉 (70)
|R10〉 = X5|ex〉+X4|ey〉 (71)
|R11〉 = X10eiθ10 |ex〉+X11eiθ11 |ey〉+X12|ez〉 . (72)
In these equations and hereafter we treat all the Xk as
real, making all phases explicit in the factors eiθk .
Can we go the remainder of the way and justify setting
eiθ1 , eiθ10 , and eiθ11 all to be real numbers? Actually, the
answer is yes, though it should have been quite plausible
in the first place: since the input states, Eqs. (44) and
(45), involve only real coefficients, there is no reason to
expect complex numbers to be necessary for describing
Eve’s probe. Let us prove this now.
The symmetry requirements
〈R10|R00〉 = 〈R01|R11〉 (73)
〈R00|R11〉 = 〈R11|R00〉 (74)
respectively, give
X5X1e
iθ1 +X4X2 = X4X10e
iθ10 +X5X11e
iθ11 , (75)
and that the quantity
X1X10e
i(θ10−θ1) +X2X11e
iθ11 (76)
is real. On the other hand, Eq. (67) requires
X1X5e
iθ1 +X2X4 +X4X10e
iθ10 +X5X11e
iθ11 = 0 . (77)
Equations (75) and (77) taken together imply that we
must have
X1X5e
iθ1 +X2X4 = 0 . (78)
Thus eiθ1 = ±1. By the same token, we must also have
ei(θ11−θ10) = ±1. Finally, these two facts along with the
reality of the quantity in Eq. (76) gives that both eiθ11
and eiθ10 are real. That is to say, we have just proven
that by suitable choice of basis and phase, all the Xk may
be assumed real without loss of generality.
The four |Rmn〉 can be visualized easily as vectors in
a three-dimensional real vector space. In fact, by mak-
ing a sketch, one immediately sees that the symmetry
requirements taken together uniquely fix the components
of the vectors up to a freedom of relative sign between X3
and X12. However, this particular freedom was already
taken away by fiat above. Therefore, we set X3 = X12.
Absorbing all the remaining phase freedom back into the
variables, we have in the final accounting:
|R00〉 = X1|ex〉+X2|ey〉+X3|ez〉 (79)
|R01〉 = X4|ex〉+X5|ey〉 (80)
|R10〉 = X5|ex〉+X4|ey〉 (81)
|R11〉 = X2|ex〉+X1|ey〉+X3|ez〉 . (82)
The unitarity relations, Eqs. (66) and (67), after all
these simplifying assumptions, become
X21 +X
2
2 +X
2
3 +X
2
4 +X
2
5 = 1 , (83)
and
X1X5 +X2X4 = 0 . (84)
This means that in our variational problem, we need only
search over three free parameters: this is a substantial
savings over approaching the problem blindly! We may
parameterize the remaining Xk in the following way:
X1 = cosλ cos θ cosφ
X2 = cosλ cos θ sinφ
X3 = sinλ (85)
X4 = cosλ sin θ cosφ
X5 = − cosλ sin θ sinφ .
How is a two-state probe—as opposed to a three-state
probe—expressed in these terms? Notice that if, for what-
ever reason, sinλ = 0, then the four |Rmn〉 will all be
confined to the same two-dimensional subspace of HE .
Thus, if at the end of the calculation we find that λ must
be an integer multiple of π, we will have demonstrated
that Eve’s probe could have been taken to be a two state
system in the first place.
4.2 After the Interaction
Let us now fix a particular unitary operator Uˆ given by
Eq. (85) and work out all the operators and quantities
relevant to both Alice and Eve.
We start by finding the density operators ρˆEs , s = 0, 1,
accessible to Eve.12 Given all the formalism developed,
it is really just a question of turning the algebraic crank.
After a lot of careful algebra, one finds:
(ρˆE0)xx =
1
2
cos2λ
(
1 + cos 2α cos 2φ
)
(86)
(ρˆE0)xy =
1
4
cos2λ
(
(cosα− sinα)2 sin 2(φ− θ)
+ (cosα+ sinα)2 sin 2(φ+ θ)
)
(87)
(ρˆE0)xz =
1
2
sin 2λ
(
sin2α sinφ cos θ
+ cos2α cosφ cos θ
+ cosα sinα (cosφ− sinφ) sin θ
)
(88)
12We list all the components rather than cut to the chase of the
final expression for Pe(Uˆ ) to save some work on the part of any-
one else that may wish to construct other information–disturbance
tradeoffs.
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(ρˆE0)yy =
1
2
cos2λ
(
1− cos 2α cos 2φ
)
(89)
(ρˆE0)yz =
1
2
sin 2λ
(
cos2α sinφ cos θ
+ sin2α cosφ cos θ
+ cosα sinα (cosφ− sinφ) sin θ
)
(90)
(ρˆE0)zz = sin
2λ . (91)
Hermiticity determines the remainder of the matrix ele-
ments for ρˆE0 . The matrix elements for ρˆ
E
1 are given by
exactly the same expressions except that cosα and sinα
are interchanged everywhere.
With all the matrix elements of ρˆE0 and ρˆ
E
1 in hand, it is
a straightforward—though tedious—matter to calculate
the eigenvalues of the operator
Γˆ′ = ρˆE1 − ρˆE0 (92)
and to arrive finally at an expression for Eve’s best-
possible probability of error. Using Eq. (47), this is
Pe(Uˆ) =
1
2
− 1
2
cos 2α
√
G(Uˆ) , (93)
where
G(Uˆ) = cos4λ cos22φ +
1
2
sin22λ
(
1− sin 2φ
)
cos2θ .
(94)
Given the particular strategy of enacting the interaction
Uˆ , Eqs. (93) and (94) completely characterize the ultimate
“information” available to Eve about Alice’s preparation
(as far as is the concern here).
Let us now turn our attention to describing Alice’s sit-
uation after her quantum system ree¨merges from Eve’s
black box. To this end we may write the overall post-
interaction state as
|ΨAEs 〉 =
∑
β
|Qsβ〉|eβ〉 , (95)
where
|Qsβ〉 =
1∑
m=0
1∑
n=0
csmUmnβ|an〉 . (96)
Then
ρˆAs =
∑
β
|Qsβ〉〈Qsβ | . (97)
Again turning the algebraic crank, one finds:
(ρˆA0 )00 = cos
2α
(
cos2λ cos2θ + sin2λ
)
+ sin2α cos2λ sin2θ (98)
(ρˆA0 )01 = cosα sinα
(
sin2λ+ cos2λ sin 2φ cos 2θ
)
+
1
2
cos2λ cos 2φ sin 2θ (99)
(ρˆA0 )11 = sin
2α
(
cos2λ cos2θ + sin2λ
)
+ cos2α cos2λ sin2θ . (100)
As before, Hermiticity determines the final matrix ele-
ment of ρˆA0 , and the matrix elements of ρˆ
A
1 are given by
the expressions above except that cosα and sinα are in-
terchanged everywhere.
Making use of Eq. (48), we finally have an expression
for the disturbance forced upon Alice’s states:
D(Uˆ) = cos2λ
(
sin2θ − 1
2
S cos 2φ sin 2θ
+
1
2
S2
(
1− sin 2φ
)
cos2θ
)
,
(101)
where S is the parameter defined by Eq. (46).
We are now in a position to make the final step toward
generating the curve of Eq. (51).
4.3 The Tradeoff Curve
We can see from Eq. (93) that the problem of finding the
smallest Pe(Uˆ) as a function of the constraint Eq. (49)
boils down to finding the largest G(Uˆ) as function of the
same constraint. Let us turn our attention along these
lines.
In order for G(Uˆ) to be maximal, it must be at least
stationary with respect to small variations δλ, δφ, and δθ
in λ, φ, and θ, respectively. Thus we must have
Gλδλ+Gφδφ+Gθδθ = 0 , (102)
where Gλ denotes the partial derivative of G(Uˆ ) with re-
spect to λ, etc. However, not all of these variations can be
made independently; we must satisfy the constraint that
D(Uˆ) remain constant. Therefore, we must have also:
Dλδλ+Dφδφ+Dθδθ = 0 . (103)
Evaluating all the partial derivatives Gλ, Dλ, Gφ, Dφ,
etc., at cosλ = 0, we can see that Eqs. (102) and (103)
are both automatically satisfied. This is no surprise, for
if cosλ = 0, then D = 0 and Pe = 1/2: when there is
no disturbance whatsoever, there can be no information
gain—this is the result established in Ref. [5].
Now suppose cosλ 6= 0 and sin 2φ 6= ±1, so that, re-
gardless of the value of θ, Eve will be able to gain some
information from her interaction. Under these conditions,
a little algebra shows that Gφ 6= 0. Thus we may trans-
form our problem into one of unconstrained variation by
taking
δφ = − 1
Gφ
(
Gλδλ+Gθδθ
)
. (104)
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Eliminating this variable from Eq. (103), we have that all
remaining stationary points must satisfy
DλGφ −DφGλ = 0 (105)
DθGφ −DφGθ = 0 . (106)
It is easily verified that both of these equations can al-
ways be satisfied by taking sinλ = 0. In particular, when
sinλ = 0, Eq. (105) is satisfied automatically. Equa-
tion (106) can be satisfied by further adjusting φ and θ.
The significance of this result is that a two-state probe
for Eve is sufficient to make the information–disturbance
tradeoff stationary. As already stated, it would be nice
to go further and show that this set of stationary points
also leads to a global maximum for G(Uˆ ), but that is a
much more difficult problem. In particular, it is clear that
there are still other solutions for Eqs. (105) and (106) with
neither cosλ = 0 nor sinλ = 0.
Henceforth, we shall rely on this weak result and nu-
merical work to take it for granted that an optimal in-
teraction Uˆ will have sinλ = 0. With this assumption,
the remainder of the problem of finding Eq. (51) greatly
simplifies. In particular, the Eq. (94) reduces to
G(Uˆ) = cos22φ . (107)
To simplify things even further, let us temporarily think
of our problem as one of minimizing D(Uˆ) subject to the
constraint that G(Uˆ) be fixed. This problem is equivalent
to the one we set out to solve, and is of use here because
we will be able to invert the results of this to get the
desired form. With this, we have, for fixed φ, that D(Uˆ)
is minimized when [19]
tan 2θ =
S cos 2φ
1− S2(1− sin 2φ) (108)
and this results in a minimal value of D(Uˆ) given by
Dmin =
1
2
− 1
2
{
S2 cos22φ+
(
1− S2 (1− sin 2φ)
)2}1/2
.
(109)
Notice again that, as G → 0, D → 0 as it should. Alter-
natively, the larger the value of G, the more information
that is gained about Alice’s system. When G = 1, so
that Eve’s probability of error is as small as it can be,
the smallest associated disturbance that can be given the
states is
d0 =
1
2
− 1
2
√
1− S2 + S4 . (110)
Equation (109) can be inverted to give the solution we
need. Using Eq. (49) and a little algebra, we obtain:
Gopt(d) =
4
γ
(√
γd(1− d)− d(1− d)
)
, (111)
where
γ = S2 − S4 = 1
4
sin24α . (112)
Taking d0 as a standard disturbance, we can finally write
the equation of the long sought after curve:
P opte (d) =
1
2
− 1
2
cos 2α
√
Gopt(d) , (113)
where
Gopt(d) = 2
√
d(1− d)
d0(1− d0) −
d(1− d)
d0(1− d0) , (114)
and d is restricted to the range [0, d0]. This completes the
exercise of finding the particular information–disturbance
principle given by Eqs. (49)–(51) for two pure states.
There are at least two (disappointing) things to notice
about Eqs. (113) and (114). The first is the energy that
had to be expended in order to work out a tradeoff relation
for one of—surely—the simplest possible cases. Given the
hoped-for foundational importance of the principle, this
is rather curious. In contrast, the general Heisenberg un-
certainty relation (in the form given by Robertson [35])
comes about via a simple application of the Schwarz in-
equality.
The second thing to note about Eqs. (113) and (114)
is the relative complexity of the curve. Why is it not
linear? Or, barring that, why are information and distur-
bance not simple reciprocals of one another or some other
such simple relation? Despite the seeming (observation
based) simplicity of the information and disturbance mea-
sures chosen for this exercise, it may just be the case that
there are still better measures to be explored. Perhaps
the proper measures to use are the ones that will give rise
to a simple compact expression for the tradeoff principle.
5 Mixed States
The deepest understanding of what the information–dis-
turbance principle has to say about quantum theory as a
whole will necessarily come from the mixed-state analog of
these considerations. For only then can a direct compar-
ison be made to classical probability distributions—the
object of study in Shannon information theory. The re-
sults of such a comparison are essential for distilling the
cut between classical and quantum theories [11].
Unfortunately, in moving to the mixed state version of
the information–disturbance principle, the mathematical
difficulties become even more acute than was the case for
pure states. This suggests strongly that new techniques
or a better formulation of the problem are called for. Nev-
ertheless there is one restricted result about information
gain versus disturbance for mixed states that brings out
an interesting mystery. This result is known as the “no-
broadcasting theorem” [3, 18].
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Suppose again that a quantum system, secretly pre-
pared by Alice in one state from the set A= {ρˆ0, ρˆ1}, is
dropped into Eve’s black box. The only difference be-
tween the present scenario and our previous considera-
tions is that now we shall suppose the black box built
solely for the purpose of broadcasting or replicating the
quantum state onto two separate quantum systems. That
is to say, a state identical to the original should appear in
each system when it is considered without regard to the
other. We are willing to allow correlation or quantum en-
tanglement between the systems. Can such a black box be
built? If so, then that will certainly provide Eve a way to
gain information about the mixed state without causing
a detectable disturbance in the system: Eve need simply
broadcast the state, give Alice one of the systems, and
make a information-gathering measurement on the other.
The standard “no-cloning” theorem of Wootters, Zurek,
and Dieks [44, 13] prohibits broadcasting when the states
in A are pure and nonorthogonal; for the only way to have
each of the broadcast systems described separately by a
pure state |ψ〉 is for their joint state to be |ψ〉|ψ〉; that
is to say, |ψ〉 must be cloned to be broadcast. When the
states in A are mixed, however, things are not a priori so
clear.
A mixed-state no-cloning theorem is not sufficient to
demonstrate no-broadcasting, for there are many conceiv-
able ways to broadcast the mixed states ρˆs without the
joint state being in the product form ρˆs ⊗ ρˆs, the mixed-
state analog of cloning. As already stated, the systems
are also allowed to be correlated or entangled in such a
way as to give the right marginal density operators. For
instance, if the density operators ρˆs are diagonal in the
same basis and have the spectral decomposition
ρˆs =
∑
b
ps(b)|b〉〈b| , (115)
a set of potential broadcasting states are the highly cor-
related joint states
Rˆs =
∑
b
ps(b) |b〉|b〉〈b|〈b| , (116)
which, though not of the product form ρˆs⊗ ρˆs, reproduces
the correct marginal density operators.
The general problem, posed formally, is this. A quan-
tum system AE is composed of two parts, A and E, each
having an N -dimensional Hilbert space. System A is se-
cretly prepared in one state from a set A={ρˆ0, ρˆ1} of two
quantum states. System E, slated to receive the unknown
state, is in a standard quantum state Σˆ. The initial state
of the composite system AE is the product state ρˆs ⊗ Σˆ,
where s = 0 or 1 specifies which state is to be broadcast.
The question that is being asked is whether there is any
physical process E (as described in Section 2.1), consis-
tent with the laws of quantum theory, that leads to an
evolution of the form
ρˆs ⊗ Σˆ −→ E(ρˆs ⊗ Σˆ) = Rˆs , (117)
where Rˆs is any state on the N
2-dimensional Hilbert
space AE such that
trA(Rˆs) = ρs and trE(Rˆs) = ρs . (118)
If there is an E that satisfies this for both ρˆ0 and ρˆ1, then
the set A can be broadcast. A special case of broadcasting
is the “cloning” evolution specified by
Ec(ρˆs ⊗ Σˆ) = ρˆs ⊗ ρˆs . (119)
It turns out that despite Eve’s best efforts, a physical
evolution can lead to broadcasting if and only if ρˆ0 and
ρˆ1 commute [3]. In this way the concept of broadcast-
ing makes a very nice communication theoretic cut be-
tween commuting and noncommuting density operators;
this is another way to express the cut between classical
and quantum state descriptions.13 It also turns out that
A is clonable if and only if ρ0 and ρ1 are identical or
orthogonal, i.e., ρ0ρ1 = 0 [3].
This result seems to indicate that a key component
in an information–disturbance principle for mixed states
will be the noncommutivity of the states in A, not their
nonorthogonality. (For pure states, the properties of
orthogonality and commutivity coincide.) The enticing
mystery that arises from the no-broadcasting theorem is
the following. Study of Eqs. (113) and (114) and their
analogs in Ref. [19] reveals that information can be gained
about the identity of two pure quantum states without
disturbance if and only if they are orthogonal. (Also see
Refs. [5, 10].) It follows that there can be information gain
without disturbance if and only if the two pure states can
be cloned. That is to say, we have the following logical
relationship for pure states in A:(
(info gain) =⇒ (disturbance)
)
⇐⇒ ¬(clonable) .
Because of this, the no-broadcasting theorem might lead
one to expect an analogous logical relation to hold for
mixed states, with broadcasting as the relevant concept.
That is, one might expect that information can be gained
without disturbance if and only if the two states can be
broadcast. This thought, however, is misguided. Life
again becomes interestingly more complex when it comes
to mixed states.
A simple example to consider is that of two density
operators ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 for which there is a basis in which
both are block diagonal with identical blocks. That is
13This is a distinction that has only appeared before in the Holevo
bound to accessible information Eq. (25): the bound is achieved by
the accessible information if and only if the signal states commute.
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to say, for illustration, each ρˆs has a structure something
like:
ρˆs =


as1 a
s
2 0 0 0 0
as3 a
s
4 0 0 0 0
0 0 bs1 b
s
2 b
s
3 0
0 0 bs4 b
s
5 b
s
6 0 · · ·
0 0 bs7 b
s
7 b
s
9 0
0 0 0 0 0 cs1
...
. . .


. (120)
Suppose furthermore that the density operators are non-
commuting on each of these blocks. Thus ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 them-
selves are noncommuting, and it follows that the set A
cannot be broadcast.
However, if—depending upon the value of s—the trace
of these blocks differ, so that, say, ρˆ0 is more likely to be
in the “a” block than ρˆ1, etc., then it follows immediately
that there are information gathering measurements that
cause no disturbance to these states. The measurement
POVM consists of a set of multidimensional projectors
onto each of the blocks in the ρˆs; this measurement can
be performed as a quantum nondemolition measurement
and yet reveals information about the identity because of
the differing likelihoods of the outcomes.
An interesting open question is the necessary and suffi-
cient mathematical criteria required of two density oper-
ators to insure that information gathering measurements
necessarily disturb the quantum states. Securing this re-
sult is surely the first step toward the formulation of a
tradeoff principle for mixed states.
6 Foundations
To close the paper, we briefly sketch an observation hint-
ing that the information–disturbance tradeoff principle it-
self has something to say about the foundations of quan-
tum theory.
Let us return to the Hilbert space HA ⊗HE—the set-
ting for so much of this paper—but, this time, with the
conviction to play a new game. Suppose, for whatever
reason, we believe all the standard quantum mechanical
axioms sound and beyond question, except one. Namely,
we hold suspect the structure of the general group of time
evolutions to which this vector space may be submitted.
Perhaps we are simply skeptics, or have always wanted a
physical mechanism for wave function collapse in isolated
systems, or have some other religious bent that leads us
in this direction; the motivation is not all that important.
To be relatively general at the outset, we might suppose
that this group T consists of all maps continuous in time
that are bijections ofHA⊗HE onto itself, and that it con-
tains at least all the unitary operations. In particular, we
may not wish to tie down the set of evolutions any further
than this—it might contain other linear maps, nonlinear
maps, maps discontinuous with respect to the topology of
the vector space, or what have you.
As it stands, not much can be said about the group T .
So let us now ask what would be required of a mapping
Φ ∈ T if it were to be capable of breaking the principles
espoused in this paper. One thing that pops to mind is
the following definition:
A mapping Φ is said to allow illegal eavesdrop-
ping (i.e., information gain without disturbance)
if there are two nonorthogonal states |s〉, s =
0, 1, in HA and a standard state |σ〉 in HE such
that14
Φ
(
|s〉|σ〉
)
= |s〉|σs〉 , (121)
where
0 ≤ |〈σ0|σ1〉| < 1 . (122)
Note that if such an illegal eavesdropping map were to
exist, then—since all the other axioms of quantum me-
chanics are still intact—an appropriate measurement on
Eve’s system alone (in principle well after the interac-
tion) would be able to reveal information about the state
|s〉 without disturbing it. This follows because the states
|σ0〉 and |σ1〉 are distinct, and by more than just a phase.
It would not be wise to base a quantum cryptographic
system on the two states |0〉 and |1〉.
Suppose now, however, having grown accustomed to the
benefits of quantum cryptography, we find the existence
of such maps simply too unbearable. We therefore take it
as a principle that time evolutions corresponding to illegal
eavesdropping cannot exist. The question is, can we still
find time evolutions in T that are more general than those
provided by the unitary group?
This is not a completely trivial question: the exclusion
of illegal eavesdropping maps from T looks to be a rather
weak condition at first sight. In particular, the formu-
lation of the eavesdropping maps given in the definition
above concerns product states only. The set of product
states on HA ⊗ HE , however, is an infinitesimally small
part of the total space. For instance, because of the gen-
erality of T , one can easily imagine maps on HA ⊗ HE
that are perfectly well behaved on product states, doing
just what we expect—i.e., preserving all inner products—
even though their behavior goes completely awry on the
set of entangled states. What is to keep these nonunitary
maps from being left in T ?
It turns out that the group property of T , the fact that
it is assumed to include the unitary group as a subgroup,
and Wigner’s famous theorem on symmetry operations
[42, 2, 34] are enough to do just this. If there is a map in
T that allows the increase or decrease of the modulus of
any inner product of two states in HA ⊗HE—it matters
14All vectors in this definition are assumed normalized.
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not whether they are product states or entangled states—
then we can construct another map that will use that
effect for illegal eavesdropping. Thus, if the information–
disturbance tradeoff principle is to be upheld, T can only
contain inner-product modulus preserving maps. And
this, in fact, is the premise for Wigner’s theorem. This
theorem states that, allowing the possible redefinition of
phase, all inner-product modulus preserving maps must
be unitary or anti-unitary. If the maps are to be contin-
uous in time, then they must be unitary.
Now, to make this argument complete, let us show how
to construct an illegal eavesdropping map from an arbi-
trary time-continuous nonunitary map Ψ on HA ⊗ HE .
Since Ψ is not unitary, its action must decrease the inner
product (modulus) of at least two states.15 Call them |φ0〉
and |φ1〉, and let
|φ′s〉 = Ψ(|φs〉) . (123)
Then we can start out by picking any two states |0〉 and
|1〉 on HA with
〈0|1〉 = 〈φ0|φ1〉 (124)
and any two states |σ0〉 and |σ1〉 on HE with
〈σ0|σ1〉 = 〈φ
′
0|φ′1〉
〈0|1〉 . (125)
Finally picking a standard state |σ〉 on HE and letting Uˆi
and Uˆf be any two unitary operators such that
Uˆi|s〉|σ〉 = |φs〉 (126)
and
Uˆf |φ′s〉 = |s〉|σs〉 , (127)
we have all the tools we need for the job. Namely, the
map
Φ = Uf ◦Ψ ◦ Ui , (128)
that is the composition of all the other maps, is an illegal
eavesdropping map. Moreover, this map is in T because
of its group property.
This simple point demonstrates that there are things
to be learned about quantum theory itself by observing
how it can be used for communication and computation.
The particular result here is not all that satisfactory in
that almost all the structure of quantum mechanics was
taken for granted at the outset. Moreover, we had to
require that T contain at least the unitary maps before we
could make any progress.16 Nevertheless, it does provide
food for thought about the directions to which quantum
information theory can turn.
15If it increases any one inner product, then it must decrease
another. See Ref. [33].
16N. Gisin has pointed out that this particular assumption can be
done away with by relying on the strengthened version of Wigner’s
theorem reported in Ref. [20].
7 Appendix: Error Probability
In this Appendix, the optimal probability of error Eq. (28)
is derived in a previously unpublished way. Previous
derivations [22, 23] have always relied on the fact that
a decision problem was of the main concern; therefore
the derivations have always taken the liberty of assuming
that an optimal POVM for error probability need only
have two outcomes.
We start with an alternative way of writing the classical
probability of error, Eq. (19) [40], namely,
Pe(p0, p1) =
1
2
−K(p0, p1) , (129)
where
K(p0, p1) =
1
2
∑
b
∣∣∣π1 p1(b)− π0 p0(b)∣∣∣ (130)
is the Kolmogorov variational distance [28]. Therefore,
finding the optimal value of Pe(p0, p1) over all measure-
ments is equivalent to finding the maximal value of the
Kolmogorov variational distance.
Using the explicit quantum mechanical forms for the
probabilities of the outcomes the measurement {Eˆb} the
Kolmogorov distance becomes
K(p0, p1) =
1
2
∑
b
∣∣∣π1tr(ρˆE1Eˆb)− π0tr(ρˆE0Eˆb)∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
b
∣∣∣tr(ΓˆEˆb)∣∣∣ . (131)
This follows from the linearity of the trace and the def-
inition of Eq. (21). Now let |γi〉 denote an orthonormal
eigenbasis for Γˆ and let γi denote the associated eigenval-
ues. Taking into account Eq. (12), we have
K(p0, p1) =
1
2
∑
b
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
γi 〈γi|Eˆb|γi〉
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∑
b
N∑
i=1
|γi| 〈γi|Eˆb|γi〉
=
1
2
N∑
i=1
|γi| 〈γi|
(∑
b
Eˆb
)
|γi〉
=
1
2
N∑
i=1
|γi| . (132)
The last expression in this, however, is equal by definition
to tr|Γˆ|. Thus we have, for all POVMs {Eˆb},
K(p0, p1) ≤ 1
2
tr|Γˆ| . (133)
To see that this upper bound can be achieved by some
POVM, simply take the Eˆb to be the projectors onto an
orthonormal eigenbasis of Γˆ.
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